Ali Larijani is not the indispensable pillar of the Iranian state. He is a relic. To suggest that his potential departure from the political or physical plane would trigger a systemic heart attack in Tehran is to fundamentally misunderstand how power has been rewired in the Islamic Republic over the last decade. The Western analyst class remains obsessed with a version of Iran that ceased to exist in 2019. They cling to the "pragmatist vs. hardliner" binary because it’s easy to plot on a spreadsheet, but it’s a fiction.
The reality? The "crisis" at the heart of Iran’s leadership has already happened. The consolidation is complete. If Larijani disappears, the ripples won't even reach the banks of the Tigris.
The Consolidation of the Deep State
For years, the narrative has been that Ali Larijani represents a "third way"—a bridge between the revolutionary zealots and the technocratic globalists. This is a polite way of saying he is a man without a country. In 2021, when the Guardian Council disqualified him from the presidential race, they didn't just sideline a candidate; they performed a clinical excision of the entire "traditional conservative" class.
The Iranian political apparatus is no longer a theater of competing factions. It is a streamlined hierarchy dominated by the Office of the Supreme Leader and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The idea that Larijani—a man currently holding the vaguely defined role of "advisor"—is the glue holding this system together is laughable. I’ve watched analysts make this same mistake with Rafsanjani. They predicted the sky would fall when he passed. Instead, the IRGC simply moved into the vacuum before the body was cold.
The system doesn't need Larijani to function because the system has spent the last five years ensuring it is Larijani-proof.
The Fallacy of the Middle Man
People often ask: "Who will negotiate with the West if the pragmatists are gone?"
This question is built on a lie. It assumes that individuals like Larijani or Zarif were the ones holding the keys to the nuclear vault. They weren't. They were the PR department. In the Iranian system, the "State" (the elected government and its advisors) proposes, but the "System" (the Nezam) disposes.
When the West mourns the fading influence of a Larijani, they are mourning their own ability to be lied to effectively. Larijani was a master of the "grand bargain" rhetoric that never quite materialized. His absence doesn't create a crisis; it creates clarity. Without the buffer of "moderate" faces, the West is forced to look at the IRGC directly. That’s not a leadership crisis for Tehran. That’s a diplomatic crisis for Washington.
The Ghost of the Majlis
Larijani’s twelve-year stint as Speaker of the Parliament (Majlis) is cited as evidence of his "deep roots" in the bureaucracy. Let’s look at the data. During his tenure, the Majlis saw its power systematically stripped and transferred to various "Supreme Councils" appointed directly by Ayatollah Khamenei.
By the time Larijani left the Speaker’s chair, the Parliament was little more than a debating club for domestic grievances. To argue that his death or departure would destabilize the legislative branch ignores the fact that the legislative branch has already been hollowed out. Power in Iran has moved from the floor of the Majlis to the boardroom of the Setad and the barracks of the Quds Force.
Why the Market Doesn't Care
If you want to see where the real power lies, follow the money. The Iranian "bonyads" (charitable trusts) and IRGC-linked firms control upwards of 50% of the GDP. These entities do not rely on Larijani’s political health. In fact, they thrive on the very isolation that his brand of "pragmatic diplomacy" sought to mitigate.
The economic elite in Tehran aren't looking for a bridge to the West. They are building a fortress economy centered on the "Look to the East" policy—specifically China and Russia. Larijani was the face of the 25-year cooperation program with China, yes, but he was the envoy, not the architect. The architects are the military-industrial complex who view Larijani as a useful, but entirely replaceable, clerk.
The Succession Delusion
The most common "lazy consensus" is that Larijani is a kingmaker in the eventual succession of the Supreme Leader.
Imagine a scenario where the Assembly of Experts meets to choose the next Rahbar. Do you honestly believe a group of octogenarian clerics and IRGC generals are going to look to a sidelined, Western-educated philosopher-politician for guidance?
Succession will be a security operation, not a political debate. The next Leader will be chosen based on their ability to maintain the internal security of the regime and the external projection of the "Axis of Resistance." Larijani, with his penchant for Kantian ethics and parliamentary maneuvering, is a liability in that room, not an asset.
The "Crisis" is a Western Projection
The "crisis at the heart of leadership" is a classic case of projection. The West sees a lack of "moderate" voices and interprets it as instability. To the Iranian leadership, the removal of these voices is a sign of strength and unity.
The IRGC doesn't want a "shrewd negotiator" in the room. They want a command-and-control structure that doesn't leak. By pushing out the Larijani clan—including his brothers Sadeq and Amoli—the system has signaled that the era of "family dynasty" politics is over. The era of the "Commando-Cleric" has begun.
Stop Looking for Reformers
The obsession with Larijani's health or political standing is a distraction from the brutal reality: the Iranian reform movement is dead, and the "centrists" are in hospice.
If you are waiting for a Larijani-led "correction" to the current trajectory of the Islamic Republic, you are betting on a horse that has already been turned into glue. The leadership isn't in crisis; it’s in a state of hyper-fixated survival. They have pruned the branches to save the trunk.
Larijani is just a leaf that’s already turned brown. When it falls, the tree won't even notice.
Stop asking if the death of Ali Larijani will change Iran. Start asking why you think the Iranian system still needs men like him to survive.
The answer is: it doesn’t.
